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Managing Innovation in Vertical Relationships
ABSTRACT
We study the structure of an optimal management for innovative activities. The top
management of a buyer hires a supplier for production. The production e¢ ciency can be
enhanced by investing in R&D before production. The buyer chooses between using its
own subunit for the R&D, or outsourcing the task to the supplier (integration of R&D and
production). Our analysis reveals that (i ) when the R&D cost is small, the buyer prefers inhouse R&D, (ii ) when the R&D cost is intermediate, the buyer prefers outsourcing R&D,
and (iii ) when the R&D cost is large, the buyer prefers in-house or outsourcing R&D,
depending on the parameter. Within the regime in which R&D outsourcing prevails, the
optimal production levels may have “partial bunching”for successful yet less favorable R&D
results, depending on the R&D cost. Thus, motivating R&D may require that less favorable
R&D results be overly and equally appreciated, unless the R&D is a failure.
Keywords: Innovation, In-house R&D, Outsourcing R&D.
JEL Classi…cation: D82, L22, L23
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Introduction

The issue of insourcing vs. outsourcing has constantly been considered important.1 As the
popularity of outsourcing grows,2 organizations tend to outsource not only their production,
but also upstream or innovative activities, such as R&D. For example, there are numerous
…rms that contract with suppliers such as Flextronics International Ltd. and Applied Engineering Inc. for various services, from OEM manufacturing to fully integrated services that
involves R&D and design as well. For some government projects, their R&Ds are conducted
in-house and only the manufacturing services are contracted with private companies, but
for other projects, both R&D and manufacturing are completely outsourced. The examples
for outsourcing only R&D task or both R&D and production tasks abound.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the structure of an optimal R&D policy in a
buyer-supplier relationship.

In particular, we want to study why the buyer (the project

owner) sometimes purchases only the manufacturing service from the supplier, and sometimes both the R&D and the manufacturing services.

We employ an agency framework

in which the buyer chooses between in-house and outsourcing R&D, while the …nal output
is always produced by the supplier.3 If the buyer chooses in-house R&D, then the task is
conducted by a subunit of the buyer, and the supplier engages in production using the R&D
result delivered from the subunit. If the buyer chooses to outsource the R&D, the supplier
conducts the R&D and uses the result to produce the …nal output. The buyer monitors the
R&D e¤ort, regardless of which party conducts the R&D. The buyer’s monitoring is more
e¢ cient for in-house R&D in that, if the buyer’s own subunit shirks, then it gets caught
with a higher probability. The buyer cannot observe the R&D result in any case.4
When the R&D is conducted in-house, the buyer’s only concern is the subunit’s hidden
action for the R&D e¤ort. Since the subunit does not produce the output, thus not using
the R&D result, it does not have any incentive to misreport the R&D result.

However,

the subunit has an incentive to shirk on the R&D e¤ort so that it can privately reap the
cost of R&D. Therefore, although there is no hidden information problem associate with
the R&D result, the buyer must motivate its own subunit to engage in the R&D activity.
And the supplier’s production is always at the …rst-best level (the marginal bene…t equals
1

See Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) for seminal works.
See Harrison and Kelley (1993).
3
Therefore, we are implicitly assuming that the buyer does not have the production capacity, or the
2

opportunity cost of production for the buyer is too high.
4
Our result does not change when the buyer observe the R&D result when the task is conducted in-house.
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marginal cost), because he5 has no private information about the R&D result.
When the R&D is conducted by the supplier, the buyer must cope with both hidden
action and hidden information problem –the supplier has an incentive to shirk on the R&D
e¤ort, and since the supplier uses the R&D result in the production stage, he may have an
incentive to misreport the R&D result to command information rent. Thus, unlike the case
of in-house R&D, the optimal production levels when the supplier conducts the R&D are
accompanied by distortions. Our analysis reveals that for a large R&D cost, the optimal
production levels are not only distorted upward, but also partially bunched for the cases in
which the R&D was successful, yet the result was less favorable. This result implies that,
to induce the supplier to make a sincere e¤ort for R&D, the buyer must overly and equally
appreciate less favorable results of R&D, unless the R&D is a complete failure.
The magnitude and direction of the distortion depends on the cost of R&D when the
supplier conducts the R&D. When the R&D cost is small enough, the supplier’s incentive
for the R&D e¤ort is not an issue, since he wants to reap information rent associated with
a successful R&D result.

After conducting the R&D, the supplier has an incentive to

understate the result. By doing so the supplier can exaggerate the cost of production for
a higher compensation.

As usual in the standard screening problem, the buyer distorts

schedule of the production level downward to extract the supplier’s information rent in such
a case. As the cost of R&D becomes larger, however, the buyer faces a di¤erent incentive.
To induce a sincere R&D e¤ort when it is costly enough, the payment associated with
successful R&D must be large.

With a large payment for successful R&D, however, the

supplier may pretend to have succeeded in R&D without conducting one. By doing so, the
supplier can get away with a large payment and also save a large R&D cost. To discourage
the supplier from claiming that R&D succeeded without conducting one, the buyer requires
the supplier to over-produce when he reports that the R&D was successful.
With R&D outsourcing, a large enough R&D cost brings about not only the upward
distortions, but also partial bunching in the production levels when the R&D was successful
but the result is less favorable. If the supplier decides to report that R&D was successful
without conducting one, he will report that although successful, the result is the least
favorable (but still better than a failure). By doing so, the supplier can avoid su¤ering a
large production level at the highest cost. To prevent such misreporting, the buyer increases
the production level even further for that particular R&D result. This, however, attracts
an understatement of the R&D result when the supplier in fact conducts the R&D and the
5

The buyer refers to “she,” the buyer’s subunit “it,” and the supplier “he.”
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result is successful. Consequently, when successful, the R&D results are treated equally for
the less favorable states, and thus the optimal production levels have partial bunching.
We endogenize the optimal R&D policy by comparing in-house and outsourcing R&D.6
When the cost of R&D is small, the buyer prefers in-house R&D. As mentioned above,
with in-house R&D, the only incentive problem is the hidden action for the R&D e¤ort.
Therefore, although the buyer must give up some rent to its subunit for R&D e¤ort, the
supplier’s production levels are at the …rst-best since the supplier captures no information
rent. For a small R&D cost, the moral hazard problem associated with the subunit’s R&D
e¤ort is not very costly to the buyer, and consequently, in-house R&D is preferred.
When the cost of R&D is intermediate, however, the buyer prefers outsourcing R&D.
While the policy of in-house R&D has a merit of the …rst-best production levels, it has a
disadvantage. Since the subunit does not use the R&D result for production, she can only
motivate the subunit’s e¤ort by monitoring his e¤ort. When the R&D and the production
are integrated so that the supplier also conducts the R&D, the buyer has an additional
device to motivate the supplier for his R&D e¤ort – the level of production.

When the

R&D and the production are integrated, the supplier’s incentive for the R&D e¤ort is
a¤ected by his incentive to be privately informed at the production stage, and the buyer
can manipulate the production levels to provide the right incentive to the supplier. As a
result, when the R&D cost is not so small, in-house R&D becomes less attractive, and the
buyer chooses to have more incentive devices by integrating the R&D and the production
task.
When the cost of R&D is large, the optimal R&D policy depends on the e¢ ciency of
the monitoring for the R&D e¤ort. Again, with outsourcing R&D, the optimal production
levels are distorted to provide the right incentive to the supplier. For a large R&D cost,
the distortions in production levels are already very large, and therefore it is not optimal
for the buyer to increase the distortions any further if the cost of R&D becomes larger.
As the R&D cost increases, therefore, the buyer eventually stops increasing distortions
in the production levels, and the buyer’s marginal loss for an increase in the R&D cost
becomes depending solely on the e¢ ciency of the e¤ort monitoring. Consequently, when
the monitoring e¢ ciency with in-house R&D is higher enough compared to the one with
outsourcing R&D, the buyer’s payo¤ is higher with in-house R&D for a large R&D cost.
According to our result, the optimal R&D policy for a small R&D cost is conducting
the task in-house for removing the hidden information problem at the stage of production.
6

In the concluding section, we also discuss the case in wihch the buyer hires a third party R&D …rm.
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The optimal policy for an intermediate R&D cost is outsourcing the task to the supplier for
mitigating the hidden action problem at the stage of R&D. Finally, the optimal policy for a
large R&D cost can again be in-house R&D for the e¢ ciency of monitoring. We show that
within the regime in which the policy of outsourcing R&D prevails, the optimal production
schedule has the partial bunching for a successful yet less favorable R&D results, depending
on the R&D cost.

As mentioned above, therefore, it is implied that motivating a costly

R&D may require that less favorable R&D results be overly and equally appreciated, unless
the result is a complete failure.
Among numerous works on incentives for innovation,7 studies more related to ours
include Holmstrom (1989), Aghion and Tirole (1994, 1997), and Cornelli and Schankerman
(1999). Holmstrom (1989) adopts a moral hazard model to analyze the optimal portfolio
mix of horizontally di¤erent tasks. The author show that risky and innovative tasks should
not be mixed with safe and routine task since it may lead to misallocation of risk. Aghion
and Tirole (1994, 1997) employ an incomplete contract frameworks to show that providing
a research unit with authority or property right over the outcome may allow the unit to
misuse its right, but increases the unit’s incentive to be engage in innovative activities.
We take a complete contract approach with both moral hazard and adverse selection, and
focuses on the issue of in-house vs. outsourcing innovation,8 and production distortions.
Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), like our paper, cope with both moral hazard and adverse
selection. The authors argue that a uniform reward for innovation is suboptimal, whereas
we demonstrate that partial uniform reward may be optimal to motivate innovation. The
key di¤erence is that, in their paper, the hidden information is not a result of R&D e¤ort.
In our paper, the hidden information is the R&D result, which is the product of R&D e¤ort.
Lewis and Sappington (1993), in a pure adverse selection model, show that the optimal
contract entails bunching in the production levels for a truthful report, if there is a chance
that the supplier is uninformed.

In our paper, the supplier’s e¤ort determines the pro-

duction cost, and the bunching in the production schedule is to induce the supplier’s e¤ort
as well as a truthful report.

Lewis and Sappington (1997), like ours, adopts the frame-

work with both moral hazard and adverse selection.9 The authors argue that it is always
optimal to separate the tasks of information gathering and production, if the contract to
7

Unlike ours, much of the literature deals with inter-organizational situations such as oligopolistic com-

petition. See, for example, Katz (1986), Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) and Cans and Stern (2000).
8
See Ulset (1996) for an empirical study on R&D outsourcing.
9
Other papers analyzing an optimal contracting problem with moral hazard and adverse selection include
Cremer, Khalil and Rochet (1998a , 1998b ) and Dai, Lewis and Lopomo (2006).
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the information gathering agent can be costlessly contingent on the production cost that
is observable in the later stage. In practice, however, such contingency may be too costly
to be designed and enforced: We take this approach, and integrating R&D and production
can be optimal in the current paper.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) study a situation in which an innovative activity can
be outsourced from multiple parties. The authors show that using multiple parties do not
always provide the best incentive for such activities. Khalil, Kim and Shin (2006) show that
it is optimal to “partially” separate the upstream and downstream tasks. In their paper,
the buyer uses the same party for the upstream task, while she can use another party for
the downstream task. Thus, separation/integration of the upstream and the downstream
tasks is contingent on the report from the information gathering party. By contrast, in our
paper, the buyer uses the same party for the downstream task, but she can use di¤erent
party for the upstream task.

As a result, separation/integration of the tasks cannot be

contingent on the report of the R&D result, and optimal separation or integration of the
upstream and down stream tasks is not partial in our paper for given parameters. Also,
e¤ort monitoring plays an important role in our paper –without monitoring the R&D e¤ort,
separation of the two tasks (in-house R&D) is never optimal in our model.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In
Section 3, we discuss the case in which the R&D is conducted in-house. The case in which
the buyer outsources the R&D to the supplier is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we
compare the optimal outcomes in the previous two sections to endogenize the R&D policy.
We conclude with some extensions in Section 6. All proofs are in Appendix.

2

Model

We consider a vertical relationship in which the top management of a monopsonistic buyer
contracts with a supplier for the production level q of a good (alternatively, q can be
interpreted as the size of the project).

The buyer’s valuation of the good is V (q), an

increasing concave function that satis…es the Inada condition. At the outset, both parties
know that without R&D, the production cost is

0 q;

where

0

is the marginal cost of

production. The buyer can use a subunit of the organization to conduct a cost-reduction
10

The buyer constantly but imperfectly monitors the R&D e¤ort in our model, and thus monitoring is not

a choice variable. There are numerous studies that analyze optimal monitoring policies. See for example,
Baron and Besanko (1984), Border and Sobel (1987), Mookherjee and Png (1989), Demougin and Fluet
(2001), Dunne and Lowenstein (1995) among others.
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R&D (in-house R&D), or let the supplier conducts the task (outsourcing R&D). The cost
of conducting the R&D is denoted by C:
It is common knowledge that the R&D succeeds with probability p (therefore fails with
probability 1

p).

from the range

When the R&D succeeds, the marginal cost of production is drawn
= [ ; ] according to the distribution F ( ) and the associated density

function f ( ); where the standard assumption F ( )=f ( )
the marginal cost remains to be

0 (>

0 holds. When the R&D fails,

): We assume that C is not prohibitively large that

the buyer wants to induce R&D by the supplier.
The R&D e¤ort, regardless of the conducting party (either the buyer’s subunit or the
supplier), is monitored constantly but imperfectly by the buyer.11 This allows us to make
our point in a simpler way because with the constant monitoring, we do not need to treat
monitoring as the buyer’s choice variable. As mentioned in the introduction, monitoring
the R&D e¤ort plays a key role when the R&D is conducted in-house. It is a well known
result that, with an unbounded penalty, there is no incentive problem.12 In our model,
we rule out unbounded penalties –to illustrate our result in a simple way, we assume that
one can quit or walk away anytime.
production

The result of the R&D, i.e., the marginal cost of

2 f 0 ; g; is not observed by the buyer (the top management) in any case.13

In this paper we assume that the following inequality holds:
1 p
:
f( )

0

(1)

The expression in (1) says that the gap between the state of failure and the state of the
worst success is large enough, which assures that the usual monotonicity in the production
levels is satis…ed without the moral hazard problem in the R&D e¤ort.
In-house R&D: As mentioned before, the R&D e¤ort is monitored constantly but imperfectly.

Therefore, if the subunit shirks on the R&D e¤ort by not spending C for the

R&D, it gets caught with probability
11

I

(with probability 1

I,

therefore, the subunit gets

It is implicitly assumed that the party that conducts the R&D is wealth-constrained and thus the buyer

cannot sell the …rm to the R&D conducting party.
12
See, for example, Riordan and Sappington (1988) or Demougin and Garvie (1991).
13
More generally, when the R&D is conducted in-house, the buyer might be able to imperfectly observe
the R&D result.

As becomes clear later, however, since the subunit does not use the R&D result for

production, the moral hazard problem is the sole concern of the buyer when the R&D is conducted inhouse. The buyer’s information on the R&D result through monitoring simply a¤ects the probability that
the subunit gets caught when shirking.

Therefore, in such a case, the e¤ort monitoring in our model for

in-house R&D can be interpreted as a result of monitoring both the R&D e¤ort and the result.
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away with shirking).

When the R&D is conducted in-house, the R&D task is separated
I
I
from production, and the top management’s o¤er to the subunit speci…es t(b ); where b

is the subunit’s report of the R&D result
contingent on his report.

2 f 0 ; g and t is the transfer to the subunit

I
I
The buyer’s o¤er to the supplier for production speci…es fq(b ); T (b )g; the production

level and the transfer contingent on the subunit’s report on the R&D result. The timing
is summarized below:

I
The buyer o¤ers t(b ) to its own subunit.

The subunit decides whether or not to conduct R&D.
The subunit learns

I
I
2 f 0 ; g privately, announces b and receives t(b ):

I
I
The buyer o¤ers fq(b ); T (b )g to the supplier.

The supplier engages in production and receives the transfer.

Outsourcing R&D: When the R&D task is outsourced, thus being conducted by the
supplier, the R&D e¤ort is monitored less e¢ ciently compared to when the task is conducted
in-house. If the supplier does not spend C for the R&D, then he gets caught with probability
S,

where

S

I:

Here the R&D and production tasks are integrated, and the buyer’s
S
S
S
o¤er to the supplier speci…es fq(b ); T (b )g; where b denotes the supplier’s report of the
R&D result

<

2 f 0 ; g: The timing is as follows:

S
S
The buyer o¤ers fq(b ); T (b )g to the supplier.

The supplier decides whether or not to conduct the R&D.
The supplier learns

S
2 f 0 ; g privately and announces b .

The supplier engages in production and receives the transfer.
As a benchmark, we present the optimal outcome under full information.

Without

hidden action (for the R&D e¤ort) and hidden information (the R&D result), the optimal
production schedule is characterized by:
V 0 (q ( )) = :
With in-house R&D, the transfers are t ( ) = C to the subunit, and T ( ) = q ( ) to
the supplier. With outsourcing R&D, the transfer to the supplier is T ( ) = q ( ) + C:
8

Under full information, the supplier is required to produce the e¢ cient level of output, and
the buyer provides zero rent. For later use, we de…ne:
V (q ( ))
0

3

q ( ) for

V (q ( 0 ))

0q

2

( 0 ) for

=

;
0:

In-house R&D

As described above, if the R&D is separated from the supplier and conducted in-house, the
I
top management of the buyer o¤ers its own subunit t(b ), the transfer contingent on the

subunit’s report of the R&D result. After the R&D result is announced publicly, the buyer
I
I
o¤ers q(b ) and T (b ) to the supplier. In light of the backward induction, we present the
optimal outcome from the end of the time line to the beginning.

Since the supplier has no private information, he receives zero rent, i.e., T ( ) = q( );
I
where the true R&D result = b by the Revelation Principle. The optimal production
schedule is the same as the one under full information:
q I ( ) = q ( ):
When the buyer deals with its own subunit, she must cope with incentive issues. Since

the subunit does not use the R&D result, the only way to remove the subunit’s incentive
I
I
to misreport is to make the transfer t(b ) constant for all b 2 f 0 ; g; provided that no

shirking is detected:

I
I
t(b ) = t; for b 2 f 0 ; g:

When shirking is detected, the transfer to the subunit is zero, due to the limited liability
in our model. The condition below must be satis…ed to induce the subunit’s R&D activity:
t

C > (1

I

)t:

(RDI )

The participation requires that:
t

C

0:

(P C I )

The buyer’s problem is to minimize t subject to constraints (P C I ) and (RDI ): Binding
(RDI ) gives the transfer to the subunit when the R&D is conducted in-house:
t = C=

I

:

Our discussion in this section is summarized in the buyer’s expected payo¤ presented in
the following proposition.
9

Proposition 1 When the R&D is conducted in-house, the buyer’s expected payo¤ is:
Z
dF ( ) + (1 p) 0 C= I :
p
Note that, without the R&D e¤ort being monitored, the buyer cannot induce the subunit’s R&D activity, because the subunit does not use R&D result for production. As
mentioned above, after the subunit announces the R&D result, the buyer o¤ers the supplier
the contract under full information since no information rent needs to be provided to the
supplier when the R&D is conducted in-house.

4

Outsourcing R&D

We now analyze the case in which the R&D task and the production tasks are integrated:
The supplier conducts the R&D before he engages in production. As in the previous section,
we present the buyer’s constraints from the end of the time line to the beginning.
Once the R&D is conducted, the supplier privately learn

2 f 0 ; g: As the revelation

principle applies, the following incentive compatibility condition must be satis…ed for the
supplier to truthfully announce the R&D result:

S
where U (b j )

S
T (b j )

S
S
2 arg max U (b j ) for 8b ; 2 f 0 ; g;
bS

S
q(b j ): A necessary condition for the above incentive com-

patibility condition gives the following expression for the supplier’s rent when the R&D is
successful:

U( ) = U( ) +
where U ( )

Z

q( )d ; for

2

(IC S )

;

U ( j ): The optimal contract must also satisfy the following incentive com-

patibility constraints that prevent the supplier from reporting that the R&D has failed when
the R&D is actually successful and vice versa:
U( )
U ( 0)

U ( 0) + (
U( )

(

S

0

)q( 0 );

(IC )

0

)q( );

(IC0S )

Notice that, together with (IC S ) which prevents misreporting within the range of
(IC0S )

is su¢ cient to prevent the supplier from any misreport of the result when

10

=

2

0:

,

Next, we present the condition that induces the R&D. The supplier’s expected payo¤
when he conducts the R&D is:
p

Z

U ( )dF ( ) + (1

p)U ( 0 ):

Using the expressions for U ( ) in (IC S ); and integrating by parts, the supplier’s expected
(net) payo¤ when he conducts the R&D is:
Z
p
q( )F ( )d + U ( ) + (1
If the supplier does not conduct the R&D, then

=

p)U ( 0 )

0

C

(2)

with certainty. If the supplier shirks

on the R&D activity and gets caught, then the buyer pays T ( 0 ) =

0q

( 0 ) and the

supplier produces q ( 0 ) ; since the supplier can choose to quit. Suppose the supplier did
S
not conduct the R&D and reports b : The supplier receives zero information rent when

S
bS
his shirking is detected by the buyer, but receives a rent of T (b )
0 q( ) if hei is not
h
S ) T (bS )
bS
caught. Therefore, the supplier’s expected net payo¤ is (1
0 q( ) if the

supplier decides not to conduct the R&D. With incentive compatibility conditions (IC S )
and (IC0S ), the supplier also reports that

=

0

if he does not conduct R&D. Then, using

(2); we can write the constraint that assures that the supplier will choose to conduct R&D:
Z
S
)U ( 0 ):
(RDS )
p
q( )F ( )d + U ( ) + (1 p)U ( 0 ) C (1
The supplier learns

before the production takes place, so his payo¤ must be greater

than his reservation payo¤ for all

in order to engage in the production. Thus, the contract

must satisfy the following participation condition for the supplier:
U( )

0; for

2 f 0 ; g:

(3)

With (IC ); (IC) and (IC0 ); (3) is implied by:
U ( 0)

(P C S )

0:

Using (IC ); the buyer’s expected payo¤,
Z
p
[V (q( )) T ( )] dF ( ) + (1

p)[V (q0 )

T ( 0 )];

can be rewritten as:
p

Z

+(1

V (q( ))
p)[[V (q0 )

+
0 q0

F( )
q( ) dF ( )
f( )
U ( 0 )]:

11

U( )

(P)

The buyer’s problem is to maximize her expected payo¤ in (P) subject to (P C S ); (RDS );
S

(IC ); and (IC0S ):
The moral hazard issue in the supplier’s R&D e¤ort depends on the cost of R&D. In
other words, the constraint that induces R&D e¤ort, (RDS ); can be binding or non-binding,
depending on the size of C: When C is very small, the supplier’s incentive associated with
conducting the R&D is not the buyer’s concern since the supplier’s expected information
rent from successful R&D gives the supplier enough incentive to conduct the R&D. When
C is su¢ ciently large, however, the supplier’s incentive for the R&D e¤ort becomes an issue.
That is, the amount of rent provided to the supplier to induce a truthful report of the R&D
result is not enough to induce his sincere R&D e¤ort.

Below, we identify the buyer’s

optimal production schedule for three di¤erent ranges of the R&D cost: small (C < C );
intermediate (C < C < C + ), and large (C > C + ):
Proposition 2 When the R&D with C < C
production levels are characterized by:
8
<
V 0 (q S ( )) =
:

0

where

+
+

(1

is conducted by the supplier, the optimal

)F ( )
;
f( )

p(1 )
1 p

0

for

2

; for

;
=

is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (RDS ) and 1 >

0;

> 0:

The downward distortions in the production levels here are well known14 –in the optimal
contract, a production level for given

is distorted downward, and the distortion increases

in : In this regime, the main incentive problem is exaggerating the cost of production.
Therefore, by distorting the production levels downward and increasing the degree of distortion in , the buyer can reduce the transfer schedule to the supplier.

This limits the

supplier’s information rent, and thus discourages the supplier from exaggerating the cost of
production.
When C is very small,

= 0 and (RDS ) and (IC0S ) are slack. As mentioned above, the

supplier’s expected information rent from the R&D is su¢ cient to induce the R&D e¤ort
when the cost of R&D is small enough. This means that the buyer does not need to reward
the supplier for a successful R&D. Consequently, when the R&D fails the supplier has
no incentive to misreport that the R&D result. As C increases, (RDS ) becomes binding
,i.e.,

> 0; and the amount of rent that induces a truthful report of R&D result is no

longer su¢ cient to induce the R&D e¤ort. The buyer must increase the supplier’s rent to
14

See Baron-Myerson (1982).
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induce his R&D e¤ort, and accordingly the production level must go up. Eventually, as C
approaches to a critical level C ; the production level approaches to the …rst-best level.
Proposition 3 When the R&D with C

< C < C + is conducted by the supplier, the

optimal production levels are characterized by:
V 0 (q S ( )) = ; for

2 f 0;

g:

As the cost of R&D increases, so does the reward to the supplier for a successful
R&D. The buyer optimally reduces the downward distortion in the production schedule and increases the supplier’s expected information rent from a successful R&D. When
C < C < C + , the buyer no longer restricts the supplier’s information rent from successful
R&D through downward distortion in the output schedule.

The supplier is required to

produce the e¢ cient level of output based upon the R&D result, and the buyer adjusts the
transfer payment, T ( ); to provide the supplier just su¢ cient information rent to conduct
R&D. Although the optimal production schedule is at the …rst best, the buyer must provide
a large amount of rent to the supplier in this regime to provide a R&D incentive.
As the R&D cost becomes yet larger, the buyer faces a di¤erent incentive issue. Again,
the transfer to the supplier for a successful R&D must increase as the R&D cost goes
Therefore, when C is large enough, i.e., C > C + ; the reward for the successful

up.

R&D becomes so large that the supplier has an incentive to misreport that the R&D was
successful without actually conducting one. Consequently, the optimal production schedule
needs to be distorted again in this regime. The following proposition presents the optimal
production levels for C > C + :
Proposition 4 When the R&D with C > C + is conducted by the supplier, the optimal
output schedule is characterized by:
8
>
+ (1
) Ff (( )) ; for 2 [ ; + );
>
>
>
<
h
i
0 S
V (q ( )) =
+ (1
) f (1 ) + 0
for 2 [
>
>
>
>
:
= 0;
0 ; for
where

is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (RD) and 1=

S

>

+

; ];

> 1:

As the supplier faces a large R&D cost, the reward for a successful R&D in this regime
must also be large. As in the previous regime, the best way to reward for a successful R&D
is to increase the output level for

2

, and in the current regime, the amount of necessary
13

rent to induce R&D is so large that the production schedule associated with a successful
R&D is distorted upward (q S ( )

q ( ) for

2

):

Figure 1 below shows the optimal output schedule in this regime. Note that there is a
“partial bunching” in the production schedule, i.e., q S ( ) is constant for

2[

+

; ]: The

intuition behind this result is as follows. Again, the reward for successful R&D is large in
this regime. The supplier has an incentive to report that the R&D was successful (instead
of reporting that it failed) without actually conducting R&D. By doing so, the supplier
can save the large R&D cost, while getting a large reward from the buyer. And when the
supplier report that the R&D is successful without even conducting one (hence
he will report that

=

=

0 ),

so he will produce the least amount of output required for a

successful R&D. To discourage the supplier from shirking on R&D and pretending that
the R&D result is , the buyer requires even higher level of production when the supplier
reports that R&D succeeded and

= : Then again, there is another hidden information

problem. After a successful R&D ( 2

); the increased production level at

supplier’s incentive to exaggerate the production cost by misreporting

increases the

as : To prevent

such a misrepresentation, the buyer requires a constant level of production for

2[

qÝSÞ
q D ÝSÞ

q S ÝSÞ, S 5 B

q D ÝSÞ, S 5 B

q S ÝS 0 Þ = q D ÝS 0 Þ

S

S+

S

S0

S

Figure 1: Optimal Production Levels with Outsourcing R&D when C > C + :
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+

; ]:

If the R&D cost C continues to increase in this regime,
value 1=

S:

Once C reaches the level such that

production schedule takes place.

= 1=

reaches its maximum possible
S;

no further distortion in the

Instead, the buyer simply increases the transfer to the

supplier. In other words, to provide an R&D incentive from a mere increase the transfer is
cheaper than the incentive provision from increasing the distortion once C reaches a certain
level. Note that

is the marginal decreases in the buyer’s payo¤ with respect to C: Also,
I:

recall from Proposition 1 that ts = C=

Thus, when the R&D is conducted in-house, the

marginal decrease in the buyer’s payo¤ with respect to C is constantly 1=
R&D outsourcing, therefore,

S

= 1=

I:

Under the

implies that the buyer’s “additional cost” from an

increase in C is solely from the supplier’s hidden action in the R&D e¤ort.

5

In-house vs. Outsourcing R&D

In this section, we endogenize the buyer’s R&D policy by comparing her payo¤s from inhouse and outsourcing R&D. With the in-house R&D, the buyer provides no information
rent to the supplier and achieves production e¢ ciency. However, despite the e¢ ciency in
the production stage, the buyer can only use e¤ort monitoring and transfer as the incentive
devices for R&D when its subunit conducts the R&D. On the other hand, when the supplier
conducts the R&D, although the supplier captures information rent from the R&D result,
the buyer has another device to motivate the supplier’s R&D e¤ort –the level of production.
When R&D and production tasks are integrated, the buyer can pair the reward for a
successful R&D with a high level of output, which helps deter the supplier from pretending
that the R&D is successful without actually conducting R&D. This trade-o¤ between
separation and integration of R&D and production leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let
For

<

I

S:

Then, there exists

such that:

, the buyer prefers in-house R&D if the cost of R&D is small enough,

and prefers outsourcing R&D otherwise.
For

>

, the buyer prefers in-house R&D if the cost of R&D is small or large

enough, and prefers outsourcing R&D otherwise.
As presented in Proposition 1, the buyer’s payment to its subunit is C=
unit captures a expected rent of C(1=

S

S,

so the sub-

1): When C is su¢ ciently small, the information

rent and production ine¢ ciency under integrated R&D exceeds the payment to the subunit. Consequently, the buyer prefers the in-house R&D to separate the R&D task from
15

production.

As C increases, however, the buyer must increase the amount of rent to its

subunit at a …xed rate. On the other hand, when R&D and production are integrated so
that the supplier conducts R&D, initially the R&D constraint is not binding as C increases.
Therefore, initially the information rent and production ine¢ ciency do not increase as the
cost of R&D increases.

When C is not small and the R&D constraint is binding, the

buyer uses additional incentive device to motivate R&D: Increasing the production levels
(therefore reducing downward production distortion) for a successful R&D. Consequently,
when C is at a intermediate level, the expected payment to the subunit under the in-house
R&D exceeds the information rent and production ine¢ ciency under the R&D outsourcing,
and the buyer prefers integrating R&D with production.
When C becomes su¢ ciently large, however, the merit of having additional incentive
device under R&D outsourcing becomes less attractive. Indeed, with a large enough C such
that

= 1=

S;

there will be no further manipulation of the production level to incentivize

the R&D e¤ort for an increase in C: As mentioned above, 1=

S

is the marginal decrease

in the buyer’s payo¤ with respect to C in such a case. Since such a marginal cost with inhouse R&D is 1=

S;

if the gap between the two monitoring e¢ ciencies is large enough, the

buyer prefers in-house R&D for a large enough R&D cost. In Figure 2 below, we illustrate
the result for

: We denote by

>

her payo¤ with outsourcing R&D, and

IN

the buyer’s payo¤ with in-house R&D,

NO(

V (q0 )

0 q0 )

her payo¤ with no R&D.

Φ(C)
ΦIN(C)

ΦOUT(C)

ΦIN(C)
ΦNO(C)
0

C–

C+

C

Figure 2: The Buyer’s Payo¤s with In-house and Outsourcing R&D.
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In summary, there can be three regions regarding the optimal R&D policy: (i ) In-house
R&D when the R&D cost is small, (ii ) outsourcing R&D when the R&D cost is intermediate,
and (iii ) when the R&D cost is large, in-house or outsourcing R&D, depending on

: As

have identi…ed, each of the R&D policy depending on the cost of R&D has di¤erent reasoning
for its optimality. The in-house R&D in (i ) is to mitigate the hidden information problem,
the R&D outsourcing in (ii ) is to mitigate the hidden action problem, and the in-house
R&D in (iii ) is for the monitoring e¢ ciency.

6

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have analyzed how to motivate a costly innovation in a vertical relationship.
Before the supplier engage in production, the buyer decides whether to conduct a e¢ ciency
enhancing R&D in-house or letting the supplier to conduct the R&D. According to our
result, the buyer prefers in-house R&D when the cost of R&D is small, but she prefers
outsourcing R&D when the cost of R&D is in the intermediate range. With a large R&D
cost, the buyer’s preference depends on the gap between the monitoring e¢ ciencies of the
two R&D policies.

Within the regime in which the buyer prefers outsourcing R&D, the

optimal production schedule has a partial bunching for a successful, but less favorable R&D
results, depending on the R&D cost.
Our analysis can be extended to several directions.

First, the binary R&D e¤ort

can be extended to a continuum. For example, the supplier determines the probability
of the successful R&D, p 2 [0; 1]; and the R&D cost is realized by C(p); with C 0 > 0

and C 00 > 0: Then, when the R&D is outsourced, the supplier chooses p to maximize
pE [U ( )] + (1

p)U ( 0 )

C(p); and the …rst order condition with respect to gives:
E [U ( )]

U ( 0 ) = C 0 (p);

which is essentially the same as (RDS ) in our model.15 In this setting, how much the buyer
values the R&D determines each regime in our model. When the buyer wants a very high
probability of success in R&D, there will be over-production with partial bunching.
Second, the buyer may be able to monitor the R&D result in addition to the R&D e¤ort.
With in-house R&D, as have pointed out, the top management’s information on R&D result
simply a¤ects the probability that the subunit gets caught when shirking, and it does not
a¤ect our qualitative results.
15

With outsourcing R&D, the buyer’s information on R&D

In more sophisticated models, F ( ) can be determined by the e¤ort level. See Szalay (2009), for example.
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results helps alleviate both the moral hazard problem (hidden e¤ort) and the adverse selection problem (hidden information), and the distortion in the optimal production schedule
will be reduced. It implies that outsourcing R&D becomes relatively more desirable when
the buyer can imperfectly monitor the R&D result.
Finally, when the R&D task is separated from the production task, the buyer may want
to hire a third party R&D …rm, instead of using its own subunit. As in the case of in-house
R&D, the buyer then faces no hidden information problem because the third party R&D
…rm has no chance to use the R&D result. Therefore, provided that the buyer’s monitoring
for the R&D e¤ort is more accurate when the R&D is conducted in-house, hiring a third
party …rm for the R&D is dominated by in-house R&D policy in our model.

Appendix
Proof of Propositions 2s4.
The Lagrangian of the buyer’s problem is given by:
Z
F( )
)q( )]dF ( ) U ( ) + (1 p)[V (q( 0 ))
L = p
[V (q( )) ( +
0 q( 0 )
f( )
Z
S
+ p[ F ( )q( )d + U ( )] [(1
) (1 p)]U ( 0 ) C + 0 U ( 0 )
+

where

1

,

U( )

0,

1,

[U ( 0 ) + (

and

2

)q( 0 )] +

0

U ( 0)

2

[U ( )

(

U ( 0 )]

)q( )] ;

0

are the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (RDS ), (P C S ),

S

(IC ), and (IC0S ), respectively.

The …rst derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to

q( 0 ); U ( 0 ); q( ); U ( ); and q( ) are given by:
Lq(
LU (

0)

Lq(

=
)

0)

= (1

(1

p)

From (A4);

1

)
2

S

[(1

= p V 0 (q( ))
LU (

Lq(

p)[V 0 (q( 0 ))

)

=

)

(1

(1

)

p(1

)+(

= pf ( ) V 0 (q( ))
= p(1

0]

1( 0

p)] + (
F( )
f( )
1

(1

)

2

+
2)

F( )
f( )

) = 0;
1)

+

2[ 0

(A1)
0

= 0;

] = 0;

(A3)

= 0;
= 0; for

(A2)

(A4)
2

:

(A5)

): Substituting it into (A2) provides that:
0

=1
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S

:

(A6)

Since the function V ( ) is strict concave and constraint (RDS ) is linear in q( ) and in C, the
buyer’s optimization problem is convex, and its Lagrangian L is concave in C: Moreover,
by strict concavity of V ( ), the buyer’s problem has a unique solution and (C) =
Thus,

is increasing in C; as L is concave in C:

(i) 0

< 1 (C < C ):

enough

= 0; and show that this in fact is that case. With

As a part of proof, we …rst conjecture that when C is small

(A6); which implies that U ( 0 ) = 0.
1

=

L0 (C).

2 +p

= 0; we have

Also from (A4); we have

> 0. Moreover, with (1), constraint

(IC0S )

1

2

0

= 1 from

= p(1

is not binding and therefore

) or
2

= 0:

From (A1); (A3); and (A5); we have:
V 0 (q( )) = +

if C < C : For 1 >
U ( 0 ) = 0. Also,

1

=

2

+

2

V 0 (q( )) = + (1

)

p(1
1

)

< C < C + ):

= 1 (C

therefore

1

1

=

=
2

2.

0

0

+

F( )
; for
f( )

such that 0 <

From (A6); we have

0

;
=

0:

< 1 if C < C < C :
S

> 0, and thus U ( 0 ) = 0.

(IC0S )

is again not binding and

=1

With condition (1), constraint

= 0. Then, (A1); (A3); and (A5) give the following expression:
2 f 0 ; g:

is increasing in C, there exists C + such that
1=

> 0, and therefore we have

2

; for

0

p

V 0 (q( )) = ; for

(iii) 1 <

S

=1

=0

= 0. From (A1); (A3); and (A5); we have:

is increasing in C, there exists C

From (A4);

Since

;

) > 0 from (A4): Again, with (1), constraint (IC0S ) is

+ p(1

V 0 (q( 0 )) =

(ii)

0

> 0; from (A6); we have

not binding and therefore

Since

2

p
; for = 0 :
0
1 p
is non-negative and increasing in C, there exists a cuto¤ point of C such that
V 0 (q( 0 )) =

Since

F( )
; for
f( )

S

(C + < C):

From (A6);

0

=1

= 1 if C < C < C + :
S

0, implying that U ( 0 )

0.

From (A5); again we have:
V 0 (q( )) = + (1

)

F( )
< ; for
f( )
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2

:

(A7)

Moreover

2

=

1

1) > 0 from (A4); implying that (IC0S ), the constraint that

+ p(

prevents the supplier from exaggerating
Now, suppose
q( 0 ) = q( ).

1

1

0 (q(

=

0,

is binding.

Then the the two incentive compatibility constraints require

However, (A1) with

> 1 implies that V
suggests that

> 0.

when

1

> 0 implies that V 0 (q( 0 )) >

0;

and (A7) with

)) < ; and together, q( ) > q( 0 ) is indicated. The contradiction

> 0 cannot hold in this case. Thus,

= 0. Then

1

2

= p(

1), and (A4)

provides
V 0 (q( )) = + (1

)

F( )
+(
f( )

) :

0

(A8)

The expression in (A8) indicates that the monotonicity condition regarding q( ) is binding
in the neighborhood of : Consequently, there exist a
2 [

+

; ].

Moreover, (A1) provides V 0 (q( 0 )) =

exists a cuto¤ point C
be greater than 1=

S;

such that 1 <

< 1=

S

if

0.

C+

+

such that q( ) is constant for

Since

is increasing in C, there

< C < C : The value of

cannot

because the buyer can always choose to motivate R&D solely by e¤ort

monitoring as in the case of in-house R&D, in which case, L0 (C) = 1=

S:

Proof of Proposition 5.
With in-house R&D, the buyer’s expected payment for the R&D is C=

I:

However, the

buyer gives no information rent to the supplier and achieves production e¢ ciency. When
C is su¢ ciently small, the information rent and production ine¢ ciency associated with
outsourcing integrated R&D exceeds C=

I.

Recall that the information rent and production

ine¢ ciency does not vary in C when C is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, the buyer prefers
in-house R&D to outsourcing R&D when C is su¢ ciently small. Next, we show that for
C

< C < C + ; the buyer prefers outsourcing R&D to in-house R&D. For C

< C < C +,

with integrated R&D, the supplier produces the e¢ cient level of output and receives zero
expected rent – his expected ex post information rent is just su¢ cient to compensate the
cost of R&D, C. On the other hand, with in-house R&D, the buyer’s expected payment
is C=

I

which leaves its R&D subunit an expected rent of C(1=

I

1): Therefore, the

buyer’s payo¤ with outsourcing R&D is higher than her payo¤ with in-house R&D in this
case.

Moreover, with outsourcing R&D, L0 (C) =

(C); and (C) is non-decreasing in
e<C
C and 0 6 (C) 6 1= S ; with in-house R&D, L0 (C) = 1= I . Thus, there exists C
e
such that the buyer prefers in-house R&D for C < C.
Again, as shown in Proof of
Proposition 4, when C is large enough, the buyer’s marginal loss with respect to C is
= 1=

S

with outsourcing R&D. Since such a marginal loss with in-house R&D is 1=

20

I;

for

I

su¢ ciently greater than

S;

the buyer’s payo¤ with in-house R&D is higher than the

one with outsourcing R&D when C is su¢ ciently larger than C + :
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